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Chinese Entertainment Industry, the case of folk Errenzhuan 
 
Abstract: Following the past thirty years of economic development in China, a substantial 
amount of research on rural migrants and urbanization has emerged. However, few address 
traditional art forms and their related socio-economic transformation. This paper scrutinizes 
how Errenzhuan, a Northeast folk peasant sing-song art form, developed to become a national 
entertainment industry within a decade, only to crumble under a change of CCP (Chinese 
Communist Party) political direction. It argues that the trajectory path of Errenzhuan reveals 
distinctive features of the Chinese cultural industry, which is developed under the dual 
pressures of economic success and CCP ideologically directed market monopoly. The party-
state’s ability to regulate the market, despite the industry’s nationwide popularity and economic 
substance, exemplifies the power of the Chinese party state ‘central bank’, which monopolizes 
the art market for the continued articulation and legitimacy of the CCP. Such phenomenon is 
identified in this paper as ‘cultural industries with Chinese characteristics’.  
Keywords: China, performing arts, entertainment, industry, folk, carnival, media, legitimacy 
 
Background 
At the turn of the 21st century, a Northeast folk performing art, Errenzhuan, rose to form an 
entertainment industry with unprecedented national and international fame. In 1990, Zhao 
Benshan, an Errenzhuan actor, was invited to perform a comedy sketch (xiaopin) at the CCTV 
(China Central Television) New Year Gala and won instant nationwide popularity. Following 
this, Zhao’s comedy sketch became the highlight of the CCTV New Year Gala, for the next 
twenty-one consecutive years1 (Du 1998). The very name of Zhao Benshan has since come to 
                                                 
1 Zhao missed the 1994 performance due to late arrival. 
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symbolise grassroots comedy and Errenzhuan laughter. In 2003, Zhao was selected as a 
Representative of the National People’s Congress, the highest political position that may be 
bestowed on an ordinary citizen in China. In the same year, Zhao established the Benshan 
Media Studio, using only Errenzhuan actors, producing comic soap operas with themes around 
the daily lives of Northeast rural peasants. In 2004, in collaboration with Liaoning University, 
Zhao set up a series of Errenzhuan BA programmes and in 2007, Zhao purchased a theatre in 
the city centre of Shenyang, naming it the Old Liu Root Theatre (Liu Laogen Dawutai)2; by 
2014 there were eight franchised Old Liu Root Theatres across China, each staging Errenzhuan 
performances, with an annual turnover of around 148 million yuan (Cao and Hu 2011: 55, 
Kong, Zheng, Yu and Zhu 2011: 227, Hou 2008: 77).  
Despite this political and economic success, Errenzhuan as an art form has always been 
highly controversial. In 2010 Zhao Benshan led an Errenzhuan troupe that toured in the United 
States of America. Local news depicted its popularity as: ‘with a 600 million-strong audience, 
prompting so many Netizens to Google Errenzhuan and his name (Zhao Benshan) that the hits 
temporarily exceeded those for Mao Zedong and Jesus Christ combined’. In the same article, 
however, Errenzhuan was described as ‘vulgar’, and Zhao’s favourite apprentice actor Xiao 
Shenyang or Little Shenyang was referred to as ‘the dirtiest man in China’ (Liu 2010). Han 
Zaifen, vice chair of the Chinese Theatre Association, condemned Errenzhuan as ‘grotesque, 
with not a trace of cultural value and depth’ (Xing 2011: 200). Criticism was targeted mainly 
at Errenzhuan’s coarse and sexually connoted speech, to which Zhao responded that 
‘Errenzhuan is like pig’s tripe, which will never be clean. Once it is thoroughly cleansed, it is 
no longer Errenzhuan’ (Xinhua Net 2014).  
                                                 
2 Old Liu Root or Liu Laogen originated from a successful comic soap opera series of the same name, directed 
by and starring Zhao Benshan. The programme was broadcasted in 2002 by CCTV and gained instant national 
popularity. Old Liu Root has since become the brand name for Zhao Benshan artistic work. 
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The controversy continued and peaked on 15th October 2014, after Xi Jinping delivered 
his Beijing Speech on Literature and Art following his succession to the Presidency. In his 
Beijing Speech, Xi stated that ' Some art works ridicule the sublime, warp the classics, subvert 
history, or defile the masses and heroic characters. In others good and evil cannot be 
distinguished, ugliness replaces beauty, and the dark side of society is over-emphasised. Still 
others blindly chase and cater to public tastes, vulgar interests, chase financial gain, and 
provoke the ecstasy of the senses'. Xi emphasised the role of artists was ‘to serve the mass and 
the Party’ and arts ‘must not lose direction in the wave of market economy and be the slave of 
capital’ (China News 2015, Xi 2014). In 2014, Zhao Benshan, who had been a member of the 
National People’s Congress for a decade, was not re-elected, nor did he appear in the 
subsequent CCTV New Year Gala. There has since been very little media exposure of 
Errenzhuan, as if the entire art form disappeared overnight.  
China’s past thirty years of economic growth has generated a substantial amount of 
research on rural migrants and urbanization (Goodman 2014, Knight and Ramani 2010, Wang 
2006, Zhang and Song 2003, Kanbur and Zhang 1999). Meanwhile, a new discourse on 
Chinese cultural industries has emerged, examining the formation of the art market in relation 
to cultural policy and CCP ideological direction (Sternberg 2017, Ma 2015, Kong 2014, Keane 
2013, O’Connor 2009, Hartley 2006). However, very little research has examined the socio-
economic evolution of traditional art forms, especially rural peasant folk forms. This paper 
aims to fill this knowledge gap.  
This paper focuses on the evolution of Errenzhuan, through which it examines the 
development of the Chinese art market under the dual pressures of economic and ideological 
censorship. Zhao Benshan is mentioned in the Background to highlight the scale of Errenzhuan 
as an entertainment industry and stress the power of the party-state in regulating the market. 
Taking an interdisciplinary approach, this paper draws theories from folk comedy, cultural 
industries and CCP legitimacy to provide an analytical structure. This paper suggests that the 
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trajectory path of Errenzhuan reveals the distinction of the Chinese cultural industry, as 
developed under CCP ideologically directed market monopoly for the continued articulation 
and legitimacy of the CCP. Such conditions are referred to in this paper as ‘cultural industries 
with Chinese characteristics’.  
For the completion of this paper, two-months of field research took place between 
January and February 2015 at Shenyang Arts Research Institute. Shenyang is the capital of the 
Northeast province. Literature and documents about Errenzhuan were accessed from local 
libraries and the Institute itself. Errenzhuan performances were attended at the Old Liu Root 
Theatre in Shenyang city and nearby regions. With the assistance of Shenyang Arts Research 
Institute, interviews with around twenty Errenzhuan artists, script writers and directors, as well 
as audience focus groups, were conducted. They form the empirical data base for this paper.  
 
Section One: Theoretical Structure 
 
Bakhtin’s Carnival, ‘a pint of tripes’ 
A large amount of material on comedy has been published, with some focus on China (Davis 
and Chey 2013, Clasquin 2001). However, none is more appropriate than that of Bakhtin to 
analyze the phenomena of Errenzhuan. In Rabelais and His World, Bakhtin developed 
Aristotle’s theory of laughter, as a unique characteristic of the human species, which acts as 
the ultimate wisdom and power of the human being, to apply it in folk carnival. To Bakhtin, 
laughter is not an abstract form but a highly interactive process between actor and audience. It 
is a gay transformation, a simultaneous uncrowning and renewal, through which the folk 
population defeat the authoritarian commandments and prohibition of death and punishment 
after death, hell and all that is more terrifying than the power exists on earth (Bakhtin 1984: 
69-122).  
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In Bakhtin’s analysis of the power of laughter, he did not idealize the folk art form. In 
fact, he refers to the peasantry grotesque realism as ‘a pint of tripes’, which is ‘blasphemous 
rather than adoring, cunning rather than intelligent; they are coarse, dirty and rampantly 
physical, revelling in oceans of strong drink … and endless coupling of bodies’. However, 
Bakhtin highlights the essence of ‘a pint of tripes’: the stomach, intestines, belly, and the sex 
organs are all the very essence of life and revival. Through the grotesque realism, the folk 
manages to ‘build its own world in opposition to the official world, its own church versus the 
official church, its own state versus the official state’ (Bakhtin 1984: 90-141). This folk 
grotesque laughter gives man a new outlook on life, which defines the path of truth, 
symbolizing the ultimate victory of human kind.  
 ‘A pint of tripes’ has been the main reference of Errenzhuan and the focal point of debate. 
This paper argues that Errenzhuan’s grotesque images and sexual reference represent the 
vitality of folk life. Dirty jokes and coarse language are essential to Errenzhuan to provoke 
laughter from the listeners, through which the official world is mocked, power is reversed, and 
the folk obtain victory. Once the grotesque realism and coarse language are eliminated under 
the dual pressures of economic and ideological censorship, Errenzhuan loses its essential folk 
power of defiance and renewal. The ability of the Chinese party-state to maintain ideological 
focus and market monopoly lies at its role as the ‘central bank’. 
 
CCP ‘Central Bank’ and Legitimacy  
The phrase ‘central bank’ was coined by the famous French cultural sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, 
who devised the concept of capital to measure social hierarchical power. Bourdieu’s capital is 
not limited in the monetary sense, but expands to a wide range of exchange forms. Whilst in 
Western countries the most valuable capital forms are economic and cultural, in socialist 
regimes such as East Germany and the Soviet Union, Bourdieu argued the most powerful 
capital forms are political and symbolic capital, as the government hold all forms of capitals, 
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monopolize market and act as a ‘central bank’. In these countries, the unequal distribution of 
capitals is the source of the observable differentness in patterns of consumption and lifestyles 
(1998). 
China, a regime structured on the Soviet model, has many examples of the party-state 
acting as a ‘central bank’ for market monopoly and its own legitimacy. Back in 1942, Mao 
Zedong delivered his Talk on Literature and Art from the then CCP headquarters in Yan’an, in 
which he declared that there was no such thing as art for art’s sake, art was to serve the Party 
and the people (Mao 1965). The speech was aimed to inspire and mobilize the underclass, the 
peasants and working class to join the CCP for the revolution, with the promise of overturning 
a feudalistic system and to become the masters of a new society. The vision was proliferated 
through diverse folk performing arts. Despite inferior military equipment and minimal 
economic power, it was through class mobilization that the CCP established the People’s 
Republic of China and claimed sole legitimate power in 1949. Throughout the 1950s, the CCP 
carried out nationwide reform of folk performing arts, known as the Three Reforms3, through 
which, the government redistributed political and symbolic capitals, making folk art an 
institutionalized elite art form and folk performers elite professional artists. In the post-Mao 
era, faced with increased marketization and globalization, the CCP continued redistribution of 
political and symbolic capitals, making new elite art forms and artists to ensure ongoing CCP 
ideological articulation and legitimacy (Ma 2015: 2-10), such is the case with Errenzhuan.  
The initial rise of Errenzhuan in the new millennium was the result of direct CCP 
support through the re-allocation of resources, such as access to CCTV - which is under the 
tight management of the CCP (Zhu and Berry 2009) - and the selection of Zhao Benshan as a 
representative of the National People’s Congress, the highest political status a Chinese citizen 
                                                 
3 Three Reforms took place in 1951 and is a process of establishing state folk opera houses (gaizhi), elevating folk 
actor’s historical underclass status to that of professional artists (gairen), and traditional folk improvisation style 
of productions changed to compulsory written scripts (gaixi), with superstitious and sexual connotation eliminated. 
China folk opera companies in the new millennium continue to exist under the structure of Three Reforms. 
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can be granted. It was through such redistribution of political and symbolic capitals that enabled 
Errenzhuan to rise to become a nationwide entertainment industry.  
Power is based on recognition, which is why the dominant group is eager to produce 
and reproduce their culture and beliefs. Misrecognition, on the other hand, is what Bourdieu 
calls the function of ‘symbolic violence’, which he defines as ‘the violence, which is exercised 
upon a social agent with his or her complicity’ (1991:167). In other words, agents are subjected 
to forms of violence (treated as inferior, denied resources, limited in their social mobility and 
aspirations), but they do not perceive it that way; rather, their situation seems to them to be ‘the 
natural order of things’. Upon receiving new political and social status, Errenzhuan artists 
become the ‘servants of the state’ and lose the folk power of mocking and challenging authority. 
This wittingly or unwittingly exploited position is an act of symbolic violence. It is within the 
system of party-state control of ‘central bank’ capitals that Errenzhuan developed as a cultural 
industry. 
 
Cultural Industries with Chinese Characteristics  
When Adorno first coined the phrase Culture Industry in the 1940s, he did not use it to celebrate 
a new economic opportunity, but to describe the entrapment of artistic value. Adorno criticized 
the capitalist market and profit driven production which causes the merging of both high and 
low cultural forms: ‘under capitalism all production is for the market; goods are produced not 
in order to meet human needs and desires but for the sake of profit, for the sake of acquiring 
further capital’ (Adorno 1991: 5). Adorno therefore reminded readers not to take the phrase 
‘industry’ too literally as it referred to the standardization of cultural forms, which lead to both 
the high and popular art forms losing their tradition and spirituality (Adorno 1991: 100).  
Adorno has often been criticised as an elitist however, his theory is still useful to 
decipher the market situation in China, as Errenzhuan evolved from a distinct folk art form to 
a standardized entertainment, precisely because of the market requirement for making profit. 
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However, the pressure was not just from the necessity for economic market development, but 
was also ideologically directed. Pan and Chan highlight that China’s party-state has full 
involvement in promoting indigenous art forms as nationalism to bolster Communist Party 
legitimacy (Pan and Chan 2000). China is increasingly on the same wavelength in terms of the 
use of indigenous culture as soft power to enhance its position in global politics (Xi 2014: 116, 
Huang and Sheng 2006).  
When Errenzhuan was perceived as being controversial, to the representation of 
China’s global cultural image, the CCP was able to regulate the entire Errenzhuan industry by 
withdrawing the two most important capital forms – political and symbolic. This was 
exemplified by Zhao Benshan not being invited to attend Xi Jinping’s 2014 Beijing Speech and 
not being re-elected as a member of the National People’s Congress. Consequently, 
Errenzhuan lost the capitals which had previously been converted into economic capitals for 
development within the cultural market. The fate of Errenzhuan therefore highlights the 
distinction of Chinese cultural markets, which develop under the dual pressures of economic 
requirement and ideological censorship. This phenomenon may be best interpreted as ‘cultural 
industries with Chinese characteristics’.  
 
Section Two: Origin of Errenzhuan  
 
Scholars trace the origin of Errenzhuan from two sources: A Northeast ancient fertility-praying 
dance and a beggars’ story-telling performance which entered the Northeast from central China. 
Another name for the Northeast is Guanwai, which means Beyond the (Eastern) Gate (of the 
Great Wall). It has historically been regarded as the place outside of civilization and law, where 
the convicts and refugees migrated to in times of war and famine. From the early 20th Century 
a popular sing song story-telling art form developed amongst Northeast labourers. The name 
9 
 
Errenzhuan first appeared in the Tai Dong Daily newspaper in 1934 and was officially recorded 
in 1953 (Wang 2009, Tian 2008: 4, Li 2007). 
Errenzhuan literally means two people, usually a male and a female, singing 
improvised literary stories in turns. Traditionally, after a day’s toil, especially in the long harsh 
winter, labourers would gather together on top of the Northeast heated brick bed to chat and to 
sing Errenzhuan, with a fan or a handkerchief as props. When the singing becomes lively, 
movements would be added, amongst which yangge4 is the most popular form. The important 
role is that of the clown, which is called xiazhuang or the lower dress. The role focuses on 
shuokou (speaking), as opposed to singing, dancing or acting and usually is taken by the male 
actor (Liu 2013: 132). He leads the narration, sexually teasing his partner, interacts with and 
amuses the audience (Yang 2007). Grotesque realism, dirty jokes and coarse language are 
essential to Errenzhuan. However, it was after mid-night, when children have been put to bed, 
that Errenzhuan became most animated.  
Sexual connotation with symbolic sexual acting through physical touching are 
performed in ‘adult only surroundings’, either late at night at home or traditionally in the ‘red 
light’ districts. This is the reason why Errenzhuan stage partners are mostly couples (Hu 2013, 
Hou 2008,). Yang Pu, Professor of Errenzhuan and director of the Northeast Arts Research 
Centre at China Jilin University explains the reasons for the highly charged sexual connotation 
and its related popularity: 
 
‘Guanwai men have historically lived in an environment with little sex and love, simply because 
they don’t have the financial means to pursue it. Many labourers came to the Northeast to work in 
mines and forests. These groups of labourers had very little opportunity to meet females. Under 
harsh economic and social conditions, many could not afford to get married. Even amongst married 
                                                 
4 Yangge is a popular Northern China folk dance. It consists the movements of three steps forward and one step 
backward, pause and repeat. Props involve fan, handkerchief and fake donkey.    
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people, most of them had arranged marriages, with little love. Lack of sexual opportunity and 
satisfied sexual activities lead to strong desires for sex and love. Explicit sexual dirty story telling 
provides satisfaction for the illusion of fulfilled sexual desire’ (Yang 2010: 49, 89).  
 
However, I would like to push this analysis further by arguing that the grotesque sexual 
connotation not only comforts the folk but allows them to challenge the official world. For 
example, the poem Homesick in the Moonlit Night (Jingyuesi), which was composed by 
Chinese scholar Li Bai during the Tang Dynasty (618-907) and has long been regarded as the 
exemplary literature of the learned class, is also popular in Errenzhuan. Instead of the official 
lines of ‘raising my head to look at the bright moon, lowering my head and miss my hometown’; 
in Errenzhuan, the actor sings the couplet as ‘raise my head to look at the bright moon, lower 
my head to pull down my trousers (to masturbate)’ (Wang 2009: 45). The humour arises from 
rhymed metaphors lining erotic sexuality with emphasis placed on lower body sexual organs, 
which is the very essence of folk life, as Bakhtin highlights, and through which the official 
world is mocked and power reversed. 
Such explicit sexual connotation and folk laughter not only creates an alternative world 
for the lower-class male, but also females who suffer the dual repressions of class and gender. 
In the Chinese classical literature, The Western Chamber (Xixiangji), one episode involves the 
young maid, named Red Lady, facilitating her Mistress to secretly meet with her beloved young 
scholar, against the will of the family. In all other Chinese theatre versions, the story focuses 
on the Red Lady’s linguistic wit. However, the Errenzhuan adaptation of the Western Chamber 
meeting has specific emphasis placed on the actual sexual intercourse: after Zhang Jun met Cui 
Yingying in the chamber, due to excitement and anxiety Zhang could not obtain an erection. 
In order to ‘save the rarely obtained occasion’, the Red Lady decided to ‘sacrifice’ herself by 
giving Zhang Jun oral sex to arouse both him and Cui. Afterwards, Zhang queried with the Red 
Lady how she could be so ‘knowledgeable’ at such a young age and the reply was: ‘if the old 
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master did not die, I could easily be your number two mother-in-law’ (Wang 2009: 77). Such 
an angle of storytelling offers an explicit challenge to the Confucian patriarchal system, where 
females, especially young female servants, form the bottom of the hierarchical structure of 
gender, class and age (Yi 2011, Yang 2010). In this alternative world, a servant girl obtained 
superiority through sex and publicly announced her victory based on her sexual performativity.  
Through the carnival aspects of linguistic ‘grotesque realism’ and degradation, 
Errenzhuan builds ‘its own world in opposition to the official world, its own state versus the 
official state’ (Bakhtin 1984: 21), and those involved obtain renewal and revival. In Northeast 
China, locals describe their devotion to Errenzhuan by saying that they ‘would rather spare a 
meal than Errenzhuan’. Food, to the lower social class is the most precious of goods. To place 
the consumption of Errenzhuan before food demonstrates the extreme popularity of this art 
form amongst the locals (Yang and Sun 2013, Yang 2007). Under the aforementioned Three 
Reforms implemented during Mao Zedong’s leadership, whilst Errenzhuan as a folk form 
achieved unprecedented artistic standards and peasant singers gained elite status, the once 
intimate actor-audience relationship was broken and folk power to mock the official world 
diminished, which led to the decline of Errenzhuan popularity. Since the post-Mao market 
reform of the 1980s, in particular from marketization of post-1992, we saw the rapid emergence 
of a body of independent Errenzhuan performers, actively evolving Errenzhuan to a popular 
regional art form, leading to the state sponsored Errenzhuan entertainment industry in the new 
millennium. 
 
Section Three: Cultural Industries with Chinese Characteristics 
 
Dual Censorship: Economic and Ideological 
Whilst the world has witnessed the unprecedented speed and scale of China’s marketization 
and globalization over the past thirty years, China also experienced large scale human 
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migration, especially rural peasants moving to urban cities. Lacking modern education and 
skills, they mostly take on low skilled labour work at construction sites or in factories (Sargeson 
2016, Wang 2006). In the Northeast region, however, there is another job opportunity that is 
open to the peasant: to sing Errenzhuan.  
In the mid-1990s, in a medium sized city such as Changchun alone, there were half a 
dozen small to medium sized theatres that specialized in Errenzhuan, with over 10,000 
independent Errenzhuan actors actively searching for work. Nearly all were rural peasants 
(Tian 1996: 160). Each night, theatre managers would invite around five pairs of Errenzhuan 
actors, each given a performing slot of between 20-30 minutes. Zhao Benshan, when looking 
back at his early career, describes the time as ‘tough’: ‘if you could not make the audience 
laugh, you would be kicked out of the theatre by the manager and there is no coming back’ 
(Zhao 2006).  
However, it was increasingly difficult to make audiences laugh through traditional 
Errrenzhuan story telling. The main audience who had the economic capital to attend theatres 
in the 1990s were the youth that grew up in the 1960s and 70s. They had little exposure to 
traditional literature and the Errenzhuan art form. Meanwhile, overwhelming numbers of 
national and international entertainments poured onto the Chinese market competing for 
consumers. Zhang Bangsong, a journalist from New Millennium Weekly describes the situation 
in the 1990s as: ‘no audience liked to hear traditional Errenzhuan singing. Most of the time, 
performers were shooed off the stage halfway through their performance’ (Quoted in Wang 
and Cheng 2011: 179). Faced with new market demand, the independent Errenzhuan artists 
had little hesitation in evolving the art form to please the consumers.  
Actors keenly adopted diverse high art and popular art forms, ranging from humour 
clips, pop songs and Western dance, to strengthen their own performing styles. For the 
Errenzhuan actors, there was only one purpose: to make the audience laugh. Only it was no 
longer for simultaneous uncrowning and renewal, but for economic gain (Wang and Cheng 
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2011, Zhao 2006, Tian 1996). By the late 1990s, Errenzhuan had grown to become a popular 
regional entertainment form, mainly amongst the Northeast working class and peasant audience. 
Locals describe the scene of Errenzhuan troupes performing in the rural countryside as 
‘millions of people watching Errenzhuan’ (wanren weiguan errenzhuan) (Zhang 2014: 12). 
Errenzhuan could have remained a regional popular culture, however, a new CCP ideological 
direction of promoting indigenous folk culture propelled Errenzhuan to develop an 
entertainment industry at a national level.  
In the 1990s, China experienced a TV boom. By 2000, 1.19 billion had access to 
television, representing 92 percent of the population (Li 2010, Hazelbarth 1997: 1). Alongside 
the rising number of television consumers was an increasing flow of television stations, both 
nationally and internationally, targeting the Chinese-speaking consumers (Zhu and Berry 2009: 
12). There was a growing awareness of using native culture to build a national identity, and 
Errenzhuan, by then a traditional folk form turned regional popular culture for the working 
class and peasants, was recognized as being an ideal subject to reinforce the CCP founding 
ideology and legitimacy (Su 2011, Xie 2007, Hu 2006, Jiang 2003, Dai 2001). Various regional 
TV stations began to invite Errenzhuan actors onto their programmes, with the most prominent 
invitee being the CCTV (Zhang 2013: 9-34). Yu Xiaofei, an Errenzhuan star performer, 
describes the sudden access to media and the rise of Errenzhuan national popularity: 
 
‘It all started in the early 2000s, Zhao Benshan was already famous then. But suddenly many 
(Errenzhuan actors) were invited onto the CCTV. The first programme I recorded was named The 
Donkey Boy (fangniuwa), it was a comedy sketch about my vocal skills in imitating the sound of 
rural life. Well, the moment it was broadcasted on CCTV, I became famous. Countless people wrote 
to the CCTV wanting to see more of my shows. I was invited back three times by CCTV to record 
further programmes. Once I was famous on CCTV, I was invited to record programmes in many 
regional television channels. I toured more than a hundred cities in China and dozens abroad. There 
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is very little or no fee for recording a television programme, but once you are famous on TV, all 
theatres want you and they do pay very handsomely’ (Private communication, 18th January 2015). 
 
There are several key issues revealed by Yu: Firstly, the link between media promotion 
and Errenzhuan’s national rise in popularity. The extensive broadcasting by central and then 
regional TV stations redistributed ‘central bank’ capital, that facilitated Errenzhuan’s quick 
rise to national fame. Secondly, instead of inviting Errenzhuan couples to perform traditional 
Errenzhuan, it mainly targeted the clown role, often with excellent acting skills, to perform 
script-based comical sketches. Thirdly, and most importantly, is the increasingly fierce 
competition within the Errenzhuan entertainment market. These three facts resulted in 
Errenzhuan artistic evolution.  
Following the rise in CCTV exposure, more peasants saw learning Errenzhuan as the 
way to gain fame and capital. Growing numbers of peasant children enrolled in Errenzhuan 
schools, which led to an expansion of the Errenzhuan education market. By 2005, nearly every 
city in the Northeast had at least one Errenzhuan school; in Jiling city, the hometown of Zhao 
Benshan, there were over 30 Errenzhuan schools, many recruiting between 300 to 500 students 
annually, the majority of the students were from the rural countryside (Zhang 2014: 128). 
Despite the rising supply of trained Errenzhuan actors, market demand for Errenzhuan 
remained limited. Yu Xiaofei stated that there was no financial gain for appearing on TV and 
that the theatre was the only means of making a living. This is to say, that increasing numbers 
of actors competed for limited performing opportunities, which led to a standardized art form 
where actors are only differentiated by the increasing amounts of sexual connotation they were 
prepared to insert into their performance. Yan Guoqing, manager of Harerbin Longjiang 
Theatre describes the Errenzhuan market in the late 2000s as follows:  
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‘Errenzhuan allows peasants to earn tens of thousands a year. It is unthinkable for peasants in any 
other trade. However, 99% of Errenzhuan performers are from the rural countryside. Like myself. 
I have only primary graduation. Most Errenzhuan performers are illiterate. In order to earn money, 
to make the audience laugh, they would do anything. But most Errenzhuan performers are mediocre. 
Facing the increasing market competition, the easiest and the quickest way to make money is to 
imitate others and to increased sexual reference to attract audience. The result? We have the ‘bottle 
neck’ effect – whichever the theatre you attend, you see the same Errenzhuan content with increased 
coarse language and rude jokes (huangduanzi) (Private communication, 18th January 2015). 
 
For folk oral art, imitation and repetition are an important part of creativity (Walter 
1982). To improvise through memory and to incorporate learned skills into artistic 
development is key to many oral art forms across the world (Ma 2015). Traditionally, it has 
been key for Errenzhuan actors to watch their peers, to learn and imitate their skills and 
incorporate them into their own performance to improve their artistic creativity. However, the 
era of media recording has changed the rules of the game, the concept and practice of creativity. 
Instead of testing one’s memory and improvisational skills, direct imitation from recorded 
media forms are a norm. Errenzhuan becomes increasingly unified and standardized, often 
named Errenxiu.  
Xiu is a phonetic translation of ‘show’. Errenxiu refers to two actors performing brief 
clips of traditional singing, modern dance, instrument playing, acrobatics and the insertion of 
coarse jokes. A typical Errenxiu in the new millennium has the following format: 
 
Male (M): let me introduce you my sexy partner XXX: (female partner walks onto stage wearing glittering bikini 
dress), oh my mother (aiya wodemaya), you wear too much. 
Female (F): how could I have worn too much?  
M: next time when you walk on stage you only need to wear two pieces. 
F: which two pieces?  
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M: a hat and a pair of shoes (audience laugh). Well, audience are happy today, let’s sing a short traditional 
Errenzhuan for them, shall we? 
F: ok. Let’s have music. 
(M and F singing Errenzhuan whilst making yangge dance movements for about two minutes). 
M: (to audience) was it good? … I can’t hear much applause. Whoever applauded, you will pick up a gold bar 
when you step out of this theatre; whoever did not applaud, you will fall onto dog shit when you step out of this 
theatre (audience eagerly applaud). Well, thank you, Errenzhuan just want to make you happy, make you laugh. 
Since everyone is so happy, I will now play an erhu instrument for everyone, and invite my partner to sing! Let’s 
have music (show continues) 
(Tengxun TV Channel) 
 
Increasingly, the army of peasant performers are trained in Errenxiu to enter the wider 
entertainment industry, such as tourist theme parks, extras in large scaled performances and 
other minor acting roles. The evolution of Errenzhuan, from a once powerful folk grotesque 
realism for renewal and revival, to 21st century Errenxiu as a standardized entertainment for 
service-based mass consumption, illustrates vividly what Adorno warned us of back in the 
1940s, the corruption of economic censorship, the loss of authenticity and creativity of art form, 
be it either high or popular (Adorno 1991:10-13). The distinction of Chinese cultural industries 
is highlighted through the corruption of Errenzhuan under the dual pressures of economic 
success and ideological censorship. 
 
Possible Clean Tripe? 
In 2009, Errenzhuan star Little Shenyang was invited to Jiangsu provincial TV studio for a live 
interview. It was chaired by nationally renowned female presenter Zhao Danjun. During the 
recording, Xiao Shenyang addressed Zhao as ‘stinky shameless one’ (chou buyaoliande), 
which amidst Errenzhuan coarse language is only a mild tease, similar to the English 
expression of ‘piss off’. However, to utter such a phrase to a female TV presenter, in a public 
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sphere with millions viewing, was perceived by Zhao as a serious insult. Zhao demanded an 
apology and when it was not delivered, she walked out of the recording studio and the show 
was cancelled. The story did not finish there. Through social media, the story was twittered 
across the nation and interestingly, most netizens showed support to Little Shenyang. The 
phrase ‘stinky shameless one’ became an instant popular youth expression nationwide 
(Chongqing News 2009).  
The CCP may have favoured Errenzhuan in early 2000s as positive folk culture for soft 
power insertion, but from the mid-2010s the attitude began to change. By 2012 China’s Internet 
users soared to the top in the world followed by the United States (Global Internet Report 2016). 
45.8% of the total population of Internet users in China are youth (CNNIC 2016, Lei 2011, 
DeBell and Chapman 2006). There is increasing concern over regulating public media use and 
much talk of internet security (Jing 2014, Cheung 2009). Whilst traditional Errenzhuan used 
to have a mid-night or ‘red light’ time and location restriction and the new millennium 
television and theatre Errenzhuan or Errenxiu performances could be regulated, internet surfers 
had more freedom in selecting their preferred clips for viewing. It was the sketches with the 
most explicit sexual dialogue that became the most widely downloaded and viewed, often by 
audiences who are curious about what Errenzhuan was and its associated reputation of ‘a pint 
of tripes’. Although humour’s subversive quality may not be able to overturn a social system 
(Westwood 2004: 11), Errenzhuan’s nationwide popularity, associated with grotesque image 
and sexual language, and wide internet accessibility, caused increasing uneasiness amongst 
CCP promotors of ideological direction and national identity building (Li 2010). Mounting 
scrutiny was placed on Errenzhuan, focusing on training schools and theatres (Zheng 2014, 
Zhang 2013). We hear the following from the Director of a Shenyang Errenzhuan School: 
 
‘Errenzhuan schools nowadays forbid students to learn any sexual related jokes – no matter how 
mild they may be. There is a female Errenzhuan performer, famous for saying rude jokes. Yes, she 
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was extremely popular in theatre circles, but she did not last long. Why? Once she was invited to 
Jilin TV studio to record a performance and it was never shown. There were far too many dirty 
jokes. Following on from that, she hardly had any invitations for stage performance. No theatre 
wants any trouble from the government’ (Private communication, anonymous 20th January 2015). 
 
Zhao Benshan may have once boldly dismissed criticism of Errenzhuan as ‘pig’s tripe’ 
and insisted that ‘once the tripe has been cleansed thoroughly, it is no longer Errenzhuan’, 
under aggregated pressure, Zhao led the promotion of ‘Green’ Errenzhuan. Green in this 
context refers to clean and purified, as opposed to yellow and pornographic. Zhao would 
allegedly fine any actor who told any coarse jokes in his franchised theatres. It has now become 
the joint determination, of both the CCP and the Errenzhuan actors, to have the pig’s tripe 
thoroughly cleansed.  
In January 2015, I attended Errenzhuan performances in the famous Shenyang Old Liu 
Root Theatre. It was the very first franchised theatre acquired by Zhao Benshan and has the 
reputation of producing the most authentic and highest quality Errenzhuan nationwide. The 
three-hour performance consisted of pairs of actors delivering their performances. Each were 
primarily dialogued sketches or skits, interspersed with clips of traditional Errenzhuan singing 
and dancing, mild slap-stick comedy, imitation of popular songs, acrobatic performance and 
interactive dialogues with the audience. The entire show contained no coarse jokes, in fact no 
sexual reference at all. Instead, throughout the night, whilst changing pairs of actors, there were 
video clips projected onto the theatre screen, narrating how Errenzhuan has evolved from a 
coarse folk peasant art form to the ‘Green Errenzhuan’, fit for the consumption of everyone, 
of any age, under CCP leadership.  
Despite this submission, the turning point had finally arrived. In late 2014, Zhao 
Benshan, the representative figure of Errenzhuan, having served for a decade as a member of 
the National People’s Congress was not invited to attend Xi Jinping’s Speech on Literature and 
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Arts at Beijing. In February 2015, after twenty-one years of consecutive performance, Zhao 
Benshan did not appear in the CCTV New Year Gala. There has since been very little media 
exposure of Errenzhuan and related entertainment forms, as if the entire entertainment industry 
disappeared overnight (South China Morning Post 2015). Westwood vividly described how the 
power of folk humour and its subversive qualities cannot always be managed (2004: 775). 
However, with the Chinese party-state’s role as the ‘central bank’, any form of cultural industry 
can fall as fast as it was allowed to rise. The evolution of Errenzhuan highlights the distinction 
of the Chinese art market, which is developed under the dual pressures of economic success as 
well as ideological censorship, for the continued articulation of CCP legitimacy. 
 
Conclusion  
 
By tracing the evolution of Errenzhuan, from a Northeast folk performing art to a popular 
nationwide entertainment industry, only to crumble under one stroke of CCP (Chinese 
Communist Party) political redirection, this paper examined the distinction of the Chinese art 
market, which is developed under the dual pressures of economic success and CCP ideological 
censorship. The standardized Errenzhuan created under these dual pressures led to the 
diminishment of its original folk power and authenticity, annulling the possibility for the folks 
to build an alternative world, to mock and to renew. 
Writing in the era of Soviet totalitarian power, Bakhtin saw folk laughter as the force 
to challenge the official ideology and was arrested for his work. However, Lunacharsky, one 
of Bakhtin’s contemporaries, who set up a Soviet government commission to study satiric 
genres, especially their connection with folk festivals such as carnival, stressed that ‘carnival 
was a kind of safety valve for passions the common people might otherwise direct to revolution’ 
which lightened Bakhtin’s original sentence after his arrest in 1929 (Bakhtin 1984: xviii). 
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Laughter is indispensable in balancing the totalitarian rule, to act as the safety valve for the 
very existence of the official institution.  
I would like to end this paper with this news: in December 2015, after Zhao Benshan’s 
year-long disappearance from the public sphere, and rumours of the uncertain fate of 
Errenzhuan, the Old Liu Root theatre Beijing branch reopened. The lowest ticket price was set 
at 580yuan, which was enough to deter any of the ordinary audience who may be interested in 
viewing Errenzhuan. It is difficult to say if such a high price was purposely marked by the 
government to highlight the commercialization of Errenzhuan or otherwise. There are also now 
very occasional TV programmes with invited Errenzhuan actors performing their latest 
comedy sketches on CCTV. Meanwhile, in the Northeast region, Errenzhuan remains as a 
popular performance, in both traditional male-female sing-song performance as well as the 
mid-night explicit sexual story entertainment. The important thing is that Errenzhuan continues 
to exist. 
The new millennium’s media and cultural industries have brought Errenzhuan, this folk 
art form, new opportunities as well as new challenges. With Xi Jinping’s emphasis of the artists 
role ‘to serve the mass and the Party’, artists and art forms will continue to negotiate their space 
for survival between the gaps of economic and ideological censorship. This paper provides a 
glimpse of the conditions of the Chinese cultural market, which is developed under economic 
pressure as well as CCP ideologically directed monopolization. The party-state’s ability to 
regulate the market, despite the industry’s extreme market success, exemplifies the power of 
the Chinese party state ‘central bank’, which monopolizes the art market for the continued 
articulation and legitimacy of the CCP. 
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